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Abstract—We propose a new class of games, called Multi-
Games (MG), in which a given number of players play a fixed
number of basic games simultaneously. Each player can have
different sets of strategies for the different basic games. In each
round of the MG, each player will have a specific set of weights,
one for each basic game, which add up to one and represent
the fraction of the player’s investment in each basic game. The
total payoff for each player is then the convex combination, with
the corresponding weights, of the payoffs it obtains in the basic
games. The basic games in a MG can be regarded as different
environments for the players, and, in particular, we submit that
MG can be used to model investment in a global economy with
different national or continental markets. When the players’
weights for the different games in MG are private information or
types with given conditional probability distributions, we obtain
a particular class of Bayesian games. We show that for the class
of so-called completely pure regular Double Game (DG) with
finite sets of types, the Nash equilibria (NE) of the basic games
can be used to compute a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the
DG in linear time with respect to the number of types of the
players. We study a DG for the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) by
extending the PD with a second so-called Social Game (SG),
generalising the notion of altruistic extension of a game in which
players have different altruistic levels (or social coefficients). We
show that, with respect to the SG we choose, the payoffs for PD
give rise to two different types of DG’s. We study two different
examples of Bayesian games in this context in which the social
coefficients have a finite set of values and each player only knows
the probability distribution of the opponent’s social coefficient.
In the first case we have a completely pure regular DG for which
we deduce a Bayesian NE. Finally, we use the second example
to compare various strategies in a round-robin tournament of
the DG for PD, in which the players can change their social
coefficients incrementally from one round to the next.
I. INTRODUCTION
Game theory was originally introduced to model the be-
haviour of rational agents in which players make independent
decisions in order to maximise their utility or payoff in
an economy [1]. The notion of Nash equilibrium (NE) has
become the key concept in game theory since John Nash’s
celebrated proof of existence of a mixed Nash equilibrium for
all finite games in 1950 [2]. A similar notion of Bayesian NE
is also at the basis of games with incomplete information as
shown by Harsanyi in 1960’s [3].
However, such an equilibrium strategy for players can only
be useful for determining or predicting economic behaviour if
it can be efficiently computed, whereas it has become clear
in a number of papers that computation of a NE or even
an approximate ǫ-Nash equilibrium is in general a compu-
tationally hard problem [4], [5]. Clearly, if the computation
of a NE is unfeasible because of its high complexity, then its
existence, despite having theoretical significance, has no value
in practice. It is thus useful to have models in game theory
for which the computation of a Nash equilibrium can be more
efficiently done than in general.
In this paper, we propose a class of games called Multi-
Games (MG) which can be used to model economic behaviour
when each player can allocate its resources in varying pro-
portions to play in a number of different environments, each
representing a basic game in its own right. Each player can
have different sets of strategies for the different basic games.
The payoff of each player in a MG is assumed to be the convex
linear combination of payoffs obtained for the basic games
weighted by the allocated proportions to them. Here we first
present a simple example of a Double Game (DG) with two
basic games.
Consider two multinational companies which can invest in
the national economies of two different countries R1 and R2
with different cost of investment, rates of profit, labour value,
interest rates etc. Suppose they need to decide in what ratio to
divide their assets for investment in the two countries and, in
addition, whether to enter into a particular venture or simply
deposit their allocated assets in some bank in each country. We
thus have two games, G1 for R1 and G2 for R2, one for each
national economy, each with two players and two strategies for
entering (E) and not entering (N ). Let πij denote the payoff
function in Gi for player j (with i, j = 1, 2).
Suppose the first player invests λ and 1− λ fractions of its
assets in R1 and R2 respectively, and assume γ and 1− γ are
the corresponding fractions for the second player. Then, the
payoff to the first player for the strategy profiles (X1, Y1) in
G1 and (X2, Y2) in G2, with Xi, Yi ∈ {E,N} for i = 1, 2,
would be
λπ11(X1, Y1) + (1 − λ)π21(X2, Y2),
whereas the payoff for the second player for the same strategy
profile would be
γπ12(X1, Y1) + (1− γ)π22(X2, Y2).
Now if the coefficients λ and γ are both private information
and can each take only a finite number of values between zero
and one, then the DG is reduced to a Bayesian game with a
finite set of types for the two players and we can look for a
Bayesian Nash equilibrium. The values 0 and 1 will always
be included in the set of possible types of each player and are
called the extreme types.
In the next section, we will define MG in general and then,
for convenience and ease of presentation, we restrict ourselves
to the class of 2-player DG in which each player has the same
set of strategies in the two basic games. We later define the
class of pure regular DG in which for the pairs of extreme
types there are four pure NE in which the strategy of each
player only depends on its own type. Similarly, for a DG with
k and ℓ types for the two players respectively, we define the
notion of a completely pure regular DG where there are k× ℓ
pure NE for all possible pairs of types of the two players in
which the strategy of each player only depends on its own type.
We then derive a test for establishing that a DG is completely
pure regular in linear time with respect to the number of types
of the players and show that a pure Bayesian equilibrium for
completely pure regular DG can be obtained directly from this
test, thus reducing the complexity of computation.
We will then apply this framework to obtain a double game
extension of the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) to model prosocial
behaviour. In this DG for PD, the first game is the classical
PD and the second game captures the social or moral gain for
cooperation for each player. We now review the concept of
prosocial behaviour and moral gain in PD.
The PD is considered a standard method for modelling
social dilemmas [6], [7]. In the 1980’s, Axelrod organised
two international round-robin tournaments in which strategies
for the repeated PD competed with each other [8], [9]. In
the competition, tit-for-tat, i.e., cooperate on the first move
and then reciprocate the opponent’s last move, proved to be
robust and became the overall winner of the tournaments [8],
[9]. Axelrod then promoted tit-for-tat, and the four associated
characteristics of (i) be nice, (ii) reciprocate, (iii) don’t be
envious, (iv) don’t be too clever, as the way reciprocal altruism
has evolved [10]. The PD has also been used to model
conditional altruistic cooperation, which has also been tested
by real monetary payoffs [11].
However, when confronted with the choice to cooperate or
defect, human beings not only consider their material score,
but also the social and moral payoffs of any decision they
make. This means that the material payoffs presented in the
PD cannot provide a complete picture of the decision making
process human beings follow. In fact, according to some re-
searchers, human social evolution has a moral direction which
has extended our moral campus in the course of thousands of
years of increasing communication and complexity in human
social organisation [12], [13]. Moreover, there are individual
and temporal variations in pro-social attitudes of human beings
with some making decisions more based on self-interest than
others. A more adequate model of human behaviour should
take into account these aspects of social evolution as well.
The same applies to economic decisions by corporations or
governments, in which actions taken can have significant social
and environmental implications, which are not incorporated in
the material gains they produce. In [14], it was proposed that a
coefficient of morality be introduced to the PD and the payoff
values of the players be accordingly changed. The so-called
altruistic extension of any finite strategic game was defined
in [15], which endows each player with an altruistic level in
the unit interval which provides the weight of the pro-social
attitude of the player. This modification aims to reflect real-
life situations and dilemmas more accurately by taking into
account both material and moral/social gains. Thus, for each
player, the payoff is a weighted, linear combination of the
payoffs for the PD and the SG. In essence, it is a convex
combination of the payoffs occurring from both material and
social dilemmas.
In this paper, we show that the DG, as an instance of MG,
provides a generalisation of the altruistic extension in [15]
which can be considered as a DG with the first game identified
as the original game and the second game as a symmetric
altruistic game. In a general DG, the social or altruistic game
is allowed to be non-symmetric, which means that in general
the altruistic payoffs for the different players may be different
even for the same strategy profile.
We furthermore consider the DG for the PD where the social
(altruistic) coefficient of each player forms a finite discrete
set of incomplete information or types thus giving rise to a
Bayesian game. We prove that this DG is in fact pure regular
and determine its Bayesian equilibrium when it is completely
pure regular.
II. MULTI GAMES
The purpose of using this model is to add a new dimension
to the description of a range of situations, achieved through
the employment of game theoretic models. This is done by
linearly combining the payoff matrices of various games and
linking them through the use of a coefficient for each player,
which represents the amount of investment that a player is
willing to commit in that particular game. More specifically
MG is defined as follows. Consider M finite N -player games
Gi (1 ≤ i ≤M ) with the strategy set Sij and payoff matrix πij
for player j (1 ≤ j ≤ N ) in the game Gj . Assume each player
j is equipped with a set of M weights λij with
∑M
j=1 λij = 1.
We define the MG N-player game G with basic games Gi as
the finite strategy game with players j (1 ≤ j ≤ N ) each
having strategy set
∏
1≤i≤M Sij and payoff
πj(
∏
1≤i≤M
sij) =
∑
1≤i≤M
λijπij(sij)
for strategy profile sij ∈ Sij and possibly incomplete in-
formation (types) λij for 1 ≤ i ≤ M . We say the MG is
uniform if for each player j, the set Sij is independent of the
game Gi, i.e., we can write Sij = Sj , and sij = si′j for
1 ≤ i ≤ i′ ≤M .
Harsanyi [16] suggested a method to solve games with
incomplete information by transforming it to a game with
imperfect information, in which a probability distribution
for each unknown value, referred to as a type, is provided.
Such a game is called a Bayesian game and a Bayesian
Nash equilibrium is then a Nash equilibrium in a Bayesian
game [17].
In this extended abstract we restrict ourselves to uniform
MG with two players N = 2. We now give a simple example
in this case . Assume that the strategy set for each player
consists of actions C and D and denote the weights for players
1 and 2 respectively by λij and γij , with 1 ≤ i ≤ M and
j = 1, 2. If the payoff matrix for the basic game Gi is given
as in TABLE I, then the payoff matrix for the MG G will be
given as in TABLE II.
Player 2
C D
Player 1
C (ai1, ai2) (bi1, bi2)
D (ci1, ci2) (di1, di2)
TABLE I: Payoff matrix of the basic games Gi
C D
C
∑
M
i=1
λiai1 ,
∑
M
i=1
γiai2
∑
M
i=1
λibi1,
∑
M
i=1
γibi2
D
∑
M
i=1
λici1,
∑
M
i=1
γici2
∑
M
i=1
λidi1,
∑
M
i=1
γidi2
TABLE II: Payoff matrix of the MG
A. Coherent pairs of NE
For finite sets of types, we assume that the weights λij for
each player j are selected from a finite discrete set, which
would denote the types of each player. When these values are
private information we have a Bayesian game.
For simplicity in this paper, we suppose our MG is uniform
with M = 2 and N = 2; our results however do extend to
the more general case. Since we now have two basic games
G1 and G2 and two players, we can denote the weights of the
first player by 1 − λ and λ, and those of the second player
by 1 − γ and γ. This means that for λ = 0 the first player
invests totally in the first game G1 whereas when λ = 1, the
first player invests totally in the second game G2. Similarly
for the second player with weight γ.
Thus, in the finite discrete case, the finite set of types of
each player is given by a set of increasing values, say λm
(1 ≤ m ≤ k) for λ and a set of increasing values, say γn
(1 ≤ n ≤ ℓ) for γ, where each type is restricted to the unit
interval. We assume in the discrete case that we always have
0 and 1 as types for each player, i.e., λ1 = γ1 = 0 and λk =
γℓ = 1, which we call the extreme types. We let G(λ,γ) denote
the DG game G with the types taking the specific values λ
and γ. In the discrete case, we in addition let Gmn denote the
DG game G with the types λm and γn selected for the two
players respectively. We refer to a NE for G(λ,γ) as a local
NE for the DG G.
Assume we have a uniform two-player DG G with basic
games G1 and G2. Given a player j, we denote as usual the
strategy set of the opponent of j by S−j .
Definition 1. The DG G has a coherent pair of pure NE for
a player j with a given type if there is an action s ∈ Sj and
actions u, v ∈ S−j such that (s, u) and (s, v) are respectively
pure NE for G with the given type for player j and the two
extreme types of the other player. In this case, the pair of
profiles ((s, u), (s, v)) is called the coherent pair of pure NE
for player j with the given type.
For example, suppose we fix a type λm with 1 ≤ m ≤ k
for the first player, then the DG has a coherent pair of pure
strategies for the first player with type λm if there are actions
s ∈ S1 and u, v ∈ S2 such that (s, u) is a pure NE for Gm1
and (s, v) is a pure NE for Gmℓ.
Proposition 2. If the DG has a coherent pair ((s, u), (s, v))
of pure NE for the first player with type λm, then there exists
an integer p with 1 ≤ p ≤ ℓ such that Gmn has (s, u) as
a pure NE for 1 ≤ n ≤ p and has (s, v) as a pure NE for
p < n ≤ ℓ.
There is also a version of the above result for mixed NE,
which holds for the general case of continuous types λ for
player 1 and γ for player 2. We denote the set of mixed
strategies over the strategy set S by M(S).
Definition 3. The DG G has a coherent pair of mixed NE
for a player j with a given type if there is a mixed strategy
σ ∈ M(Si) and mixed strategies σ0, σ1 ∈M(S−j) such that
(σ, σ0) and (σ, σ1) are respectively mixed NE for G with the
given type for player j and the two extreme types of the other
player. In this case, the pair of profiles ((σ, σ0), (σ, σ1)) is
called the coherent pair of mixed NE for player j with the
given type.
Thus, player one will have a coherent pair of mixed NE if
there exists σ ∈M(S1) and σ0, σ1 ∈ M(S2) such that (σ, σ0)
is mixed NE for Gλ,0 and (σ, σ1) is mixed NE for Gλ,1.
Proposition 4. If the DG with continuous types λ and γ has
a coherent pair of mixed NE (σ, σ0) and (σ, σ1) for the first
player with a given type λ, then for each γ in the unit interval
there exists a mixed strategy profile of the form (σ, σγ) that is
a NE for G(λ,γ).
Proof: For simplicity we present the proof for the case
that each player has a strategy set with two actions: S1 =
{C1, D1} and S2 = {C2, D2}, with the payoff matrices G(λ,0)
and G(λ,1) given in TABLE III and TABLE IV.
Suppose σ = pC1+(1−p)D1 and σγ = pγC2,+(1−pγ)D2,
where for γ = 0 and γ = 1 we obtain the pair of coherent
Player 2
C D
Player 1
C (a1, a2) (b1, b2)
D (c1, c2) (d1, d2)
TABLE III: PD - Payoff Matrix Representation
Player 2
C D
Player 1
C (e1, e2) (f1, f2)
D (g1, g2) (h1, h2)
TABLE IV: PD - Payoff Matrix Representation
mixed NE (σ, σ0) and (σ, σ1). Then a long calculation shows
that (σ, σγ) is a mixed NE for G(λ,γ) if
pγ =
(1−γ)p0[p(a−2−b2)+(1−p)(c2−d2)]+γp1[p(e2−f2)+(1−p)(g2−h2)]
(1−γ)[p(a−2−b2)+(1−p)(c2−d2)]+γ[p(e2−f2)+(1−p)(g2−h2)]
.
The general case can be proved in a similar way.
B. Pure regular DG
Next, we examine how information about the set of local
pure NE for the DG for various types of the two players can
be used to deduce the Bayesian NE for the DG. We say a
DG is pure regular if it has a set of four pairs of pure NE for
all extreme types, for which the strategy of each player only
depends on its own type. Here is the exact definition.
Definition 5. We say a DG for two players is pure regular if
there are four pure strategy profiles (s, u), (s, v), (t, u), (t, v)
such that the two pairs ((s, u), (s, v)) and ((t, u), (t, v)) are
respectively coherent pairs of pure NE for the first player
with extreme types λ = 0 and λ = 1 respectively, while the
two pairs ((s, u), (t, u)) and ((s, v), (t, v)) are respectively
coherent pairs of pure NE for the second player with extreme
types γ = 0 and γ = 1 respectively. We say that the four
strategy profiles induce pure regularity.
For a DG with a finite set of types for each player, we can
go further as follows.
Definition 6. We say a DG with finite sets of types given by
λm (1 ≤ m ≤ k) and γn (1 ≤ n ≤ ℓ) is completely pure
regular if there are pure strategies sm ∈ S1 (1 ≤ m ≤ k) and
un ∈ S2 (1 ≤ n ≤ ℓ) such that the strategy profile (sm, un)
is a pure Nash equilibrium for the game Gmn for 1 ≤ n ≤ ℓ
and 1 ≤ m ≤ k.
It is clear that a completely pure regular DG is
pure regular and thus our terminology is consistent. Note
also that for a completely pure regular DG as above
(
∏
1≤m≤k sm,
∏
1≤n≤ℓ un) is a pure Bayesian strategy in
which the first player takes action sm for type λm and the
second player takes action un for type γn. The above notions
can also be extended to mixed regular and completely mixed
regular DG.
Lemma 7. The DG is completely pure regular if and only if for
all conditional probability distributions for the types of the two
players the Bayesian pure strategy (
∏
1≤m≤k sm,
∏
1≤n≤ℓ un)
is a pure Bayesian NE.
We can determine if a DG with finite types for the two
players is completely pure regular as follows:
(i) Test if the DG is pure regular for a set of four pure NE
with extreme types.
(ii) For each set of four pure NE, which induces pure
regularity, use Proposition 2 to determine all the pure NE
for all k × ℓ combinations of pairs of types for the two
players; these will be the pure NE of Gmn for 1 ≤ m ≤ k
and 1 ≤ n ≤ ℓ.
(iii) Finally check whether the set of k × ℓ pure NE induces
a completely pure regular DG.
These three tasks (i) - (iii) can be done in linear time (i.e.,
linear in the maximum number of types max(k, ℓ) for the two
players). We therefore have the following theorem.
Theorem 8. Given any DG with finite number of types for the
two players, we can decide in linear time if it is completely
pure regular, in which case a Bayesian pure NE is obtained
in linear time.
The above theorem can be extended to any N -player MG
with M basic games and finite number of types for each
player. A generalisation to completely mixed regular DG is
also possible. In the next section, we present a pure regular
DG with a finite number of types which will give us both an
example of a completely pure regular and an example where
this property fails.
III. A DG FOR PRISONER’S DILEMMA
The PD is a fundamental non-zero-sum problem of game
theory that attempts to mathematically analyse the behaviour
of individuals in a strategic situation, in which the success of
each individual does not depend entirely on one’s choice, but
on the opponent’s as well [10]. Essentially, it is an abstract
formulation of some common situations in which what is
best for each person individually leads to mutual defection,
whereas everyone would have been better off with mutual
cooperation [10]. It has provided a tool for experimental
studies in various disciplines, such as economics, social psy-
chology, evolutionary biology and fields that are involved with
modelling of social processes, such as behaviour in decision
making [10] [18].
Each of the players competing in the PD has the choice
to cooperate (C) or defect (D) and the payoff values gained
by the combination of the aforementioned actions are T,R, P
and S.
The payoff matrix of the PD is presented in TABLE V.
Player 2
C D
Player 1
C (R,R) (S, T )
D (T, S) (P, P )
TABLE V: PD - Payoff Matrix Representation
The values of T,R, P and S satisfy the following two
inequalities:
T > R > P > S and R > (T + S)/2
The first equation specifies the order of the payoffs and
defines the dilemma, since the best a player can do is get
T (i.e. the temptation to defect payoff when the other player
cooperates), the worst a player can do is get S (i.e. the sucker’s
payoff for cooperating while the other player defects), and, in
ordering the other two outcomes, R (i.e. the reward payoff
for mutual cooperation), is assumed to be better than P (i.e.
the punishment payoff for mutual defection) [10]. The second
equation ensures that, in the repeated game, the players cannot
get out of the dilemma by taking turns in exploiting each
other. This means that an even chance of exploiting and being
exploited is not as good an outcome for a player as mutual
cooperation. Therefore, it is assumed that R is greater than
the average of T and S [10]. Finally, a special case of the
PD occurs when the apparent advantage of defecting over
cooperating is not dependent on the opponent’s choice and
the disadvantage of the opponent defecting over cooperating
is not dependent on one’s choice, as can be illustrated in the
following equation [10]:
T + S = P +R or R+ P − T − S = 0
A. The Social Game
The SG encourages cooperation and discourages defection,
as cooperating is usually considered to be the ethical and
moral choice to make when interacting with others in social
dilemmas. This can be done in different ways corresponding
to different types of payoff matrices. Here, we will restrict to
the case that the SG encourages cooperation and discourages
defection for each player, independently of the action chosen
by the other player.
We present the normal form and the mathematical for-
mulation of the SG as follows. Assume that the competing
participants in the SG are player 1 and player 2. Each of them
has the choice to select between C and D. When they have both
made their choice, the payoffs assigned to them are calculated
according to payoff matrix VI, where M1, M2 and M
′
1, M
′
2
satisfy:
M1 > M
′
1, M2 > M
′
2
When M1 = M2 and M ′1 = M ′2, we will have a symmetric
social game and our framework reduces to the altruistic
extension in [15].
Player 2
C D
Player 1
C (M1,M2) (M1,M ′2)
D (M ′
1
,M2) (M ′1,M
′
2
)
TABLE VI: SG - Payoff Matrix Representation
Thus, in the SG we treat in this paper, the players are
individually and independently rewarded for cooperating and
punished for defecting. This can be interpreted in the following
way. Cooperation by an individual, independent of the action
of the opponent, is socially rewarded by inducing a good
conscience, whereas defection is punished by creating a guilty
one. The values of M1, M2 and M
′
1, M
′
2 are assumed to be
socially determined to correspond to the average moral norm
in the given society and are considered to have evolved in the
course of increasing complexity, communication and moral
growth in human history.
B. The Double Game
Although the payoffs for the SG are determined by the social
context of the game, there is still individual variation in pro-
social behaviour of the players. We assume each player has
a social coefficient taking values between 0 and 1, which
reflects how pro-social they are in practice in each round of
the game. In our particular SG, the social coefficient of a
player signifies how much the player cares about the morality
or the social aspect of their action. The payoffs of the DG for
each player are then the weighted sum or convex combination
of the payoffs of the PD and SG using the player’s social
coefficient as represented in TABLE VII, where λ and γ (with
0 ≤ λ, γ ≤ 1) are the social coefficients of players 1 and
2, respectively. Note that the two players can still play the
standard version of the PD by selecting their social coefficients
to be equal to 0, in which case the DG reduces to the PD.
C D
C (1 - λ)R + λM1, (1 - γ)R + γM2 (1 - λ)S + λM1, (1 - γ)T + γS
D (1 - λ)T + λS, (1 - γ)S + γM2 (1 - λ)P + λS, (1 - γ)P + γS
TABLE VII: DG - Payoff Matrix Representation
In addition to the inequalities satisfied in the payoffs for
PD and SG, we stipulate the two new inequalities below that
connect the payoff values from both the PD and the SG:
M1,M2 > (R+ P )/2 and T > R > M1 ≥M2 > P > S
or T > R > M2 ≥M1 > P > S
First, we argue that M1 and M2 should be less than T ,
but greater than P . The former should hold, otherwise if M1
and M2 are equal to or greater than T , then, there is no
dilemma as to what the best strategy is (one should select
the highest possible social coefficient and always choose C
in order to achieve the highest available payoff), and, the
SG loses its meaning. On the other hand, the latter should
hold, because, if M1 and M2 are equal to or less than P ,
then, cooperation is discouraged, since one would have no
incentive to select a high social coefficient and choose C. In
addition, M1 and M2 should be strictly less than R, as we
would like to encourage cooperation in the SG by assigning
to it a payoff value that is somewhat less than the payoff
value obtained through mutual cooperation in the PD. This,
we believe, reflects more accurately real-life situations, as,
in general, the decisions based on moral incentives do not
bring high material benefits. Finally, we assume that M1 and
M2 should be greater than the average of R and P , so that
the dilemma of whether to cooperate or defect becomes more
intense.
Then, we argue that M ′1 and M
′
2 should be equal to S, so as
to discourage defection with a high social coefficient, which
would be self-contradictory, and, also, to punish, in a sense,
defection, since M ′1, M
′
2 are the payoff value for defection in
the SG, which, by its definition, should not give a high value
to defection.
The selection of the social coefficient reveals, in part, the
strategy one will follow in a given game. To illustrate this with
an example, note that the choice of social coefficient equal to
1 implies cooperation, since defection would give a payoff
of 0, and, similarly, the choice of social coefficient equal to 0
most probably implies defection, since cooperation in that case
would give a payoff of 0, unless it is mutual, in which case
it would be beneficial. On the other hand, selecting a social
coefficient between 0 and 1 leaves room for more complex and
sophisticated strategies. Finally, as we will see later on, in the
implementation of the DG, certain restrictions are imposed
on how much a player can increase or decrease the social
coefficient in a single round. This is done, since, in general,
humans do not change their moral values radically in a short
amount of time.
C. Double game with complete information
If we assume that the players know each other’s social
coefficients prior to every game, the DG becomes a game
with complete information and all payoffs are known to both
players. In this section we focus on the analysis of the Nash
equilibrium in this type of the DG. It is well known that the
Nash equilibrium for the PD is mutual defection, represented
by (D,D). However, from the perspective of the SG, the best
response of any player is to cooperate, as this always leads
to a better score as compared to defecting. As a result, if
the players make their decisions with no concern for their
opponents’ behaviour, it leads to a Nash equilibrium of mutual
cooperation, represented by (C,C). However, this simplicity
cannot be incorporated in the DG, due to the inclusion of the
social coefficient, which alters the reward for all outcomes.
In accordance with the equilibrium, we must find out how
the social coefficients of the two players alter the potential
payoffs for the four possible outcomes of the game. The
payoffs for each possible outcome change along with the
variation in the social coefficients λ and γ of players 1 and 2,
respectively, as shown in TABLE VIII.
At this stage, we consider the payoff equations for player 1.
We note that, by symmetry, a similar analysis can be conducted
for player 2. Furthermore, without loss of generality, we
assume the equality M ′1 = M
′
2 = S, since the SG punishes
defection.
For λ let us label the three crossing points of the payoff
equations as λ = a1 for π1(D,D) = π1(C,D), λ = b1 for
π1(D,C) = π1(C,C) and λ = c1 for π1(D,C) = π1(C,D). By
equating the equations for each payoff, we find the values of
the crossing points (similarly for γ) to be:
a1 =
P − S
M1 + P − 2S
, a2 =
P − S
M2 + P − 2S
(1)
b1 =
T −R
T − S +M1 −R
, b2 =
T −R
T − S +M2 −R
(2)
c1 =
T − S
M1 + T − 2S
, c2 =
T − S
M2 + T − 2S
(3)
We have the three following cases:
• a1 < b1 < c1 , a2 < b2 < c2 if P − S < T −R
• b1 < a1 < c1 , b2 < a2 < c2 if P − S > T −R
• a1 = b1 < c1 , a2 = b2 < c2 if P − S = T −R
We can obtain the Nash equilibrium points for M1,M2 > R
and M1,M2 < R and M1 = M2 = R; note that for all values
of λ and γ that are greater than b1 or b2, the equilibria are
equal. To illustrate the method, we will compute below the
Nash equilibrium for the two generic cases of a1 < b1, a2 <
b2 and b1 < a1, b2 < a2 when T > R > M1 > M2 > P >
M ′1 =M
′
2 = S.
1) Case: a1 < b1 and a2 < b2: FIGURE 1 shows the
variation in the payoffs resulting from each outcome of the
DG with different values of λ. We can describe the order
of preference for all values of λ lying between 0 and 1 by
using the values of a1, b1 and c1 and the functions shown in
FIGURE 1, and, then, we can obtain the equilibria for different
social coefficients. For instance, the preference ordering of
player 1 for 0 ≤ λ < a1 is:
(D,C) > (C,C) > (D,D) > (C,D) (4)
Since the DG is a symmetric game, similar inequalities
also hold for player 2, with the social coefficient being γ
instead of λ, and each outcome replaced with its mirror point.
For instance, while (D,C) is shown to be the most preferable
outcome for player 1 in FIGURE 1, (C, D) would take its
place for player 2. The pair (λ, γ) is a point of unit square
[0, 1]× [0, 1].
The equilibria for different social coefficients in the case of
a1 < b1 are given in FIGURE 2 for the generic sub-rectangles
and are also presented in TABLE VIII, which includes the
boundary points of these 9 regions. Note that on any boundary
point of 2 or 4 generic regions, the set of equilibria is precisely
the union of equilibria in the neighbouring generic regions.
D,C
C,C
D,D
C,D
P
S
M1
R
T
P
S
M1
R
T
0 a1 b1 c1 1
a1 < b1 < c1
Fig. 1: Change of payoffs (T > R > M1 > M2 > P > M ′1 =
M ′2 = S)
a2
0
b2
1
0 a1 b1 1
(D,C)
(D,C)
(D,D)
(D,C)
(C,D),(D,C)
(C,D)
(C,C)
(C,D)
(C,D)
Fig. 2: The set of equilibria for each of the 9 generic regions
(a1 < b1, a2 < b2)
2) Case: b1 < a1 and b2 < a2: FIGURE 3 illustrates the
change in payoffs resulting from each outcome of the DG
with different values of λ in the case of b1 < a1. FIGURE 4
provides the set of equilibria for each of the 9 generic regions
and TABLE IX presents the equilibria for all possible social
coefficients.
D. Double game with incomplete information
We now assume that the players do not know each other’s
social coefficients prior to any game, which means that they
do not know the full values of the payoff matrix. Thus, the
game has two-sided incomplete information. We assume that
the social coefficient of each player has a finite number of
possible values and that the probability distribution of the
social coefficient is common knowledge between the two
players. We also assume that, at the start of the game, each
player is aware of the value of their own social coefficient
(private information) or type, but not the value of the social
b2 < γ ≤ 1 (D,C) (D,C) (D,C) (C,C),(D,C) (C,C)
γ = b2 (D,C) (C,D),(D,C) (C,D),(D,C) (C,C),(C,D),(D,C) (C,C),(C,D)
a2 < γ < b2 (D,C) (C,D),(D,C) (C,D),(D,C) (C,D),(D,C) (C,D)
γ = a2 (D,D),(D,C) (D,D),(D,C),(C,D) (C,D),(D,C) (C,D),(D,C) (C,D)
0 ≤ γ < a2 (D,D) (D,D),(C,D) (C,D) (C,D) (C,D)
0 ≤ λ < a1 λ = a1 a1 < λ < b1 λ = b1 b1 < λ ≤ 1
TABLE VIII: The equilibria for different social coefficients
for a1 < b1 and a2 < b2
D,C
C,C
D,D
C,DP
S
M1
R
T
P
S
M1
R
T
0 a1b1 c1 1
b1 < a1 < c1
Fig. 3: Change of payoffs (The variation of payoffs (T > R >
M1 > M2 > P > M
′
1 = M
′
2 = S)
coefficient of the opponent. In that way, each player relies on a
probabilistic inference to predict the opponent’s actions. From
TABLES VIII and IX, we see immediately that for extreme
types λ, γ = 0, 1, we have the pure NE (D,D), (C,D),
(D,C) and (C,C) and it follows immediately that in both
cases of a1 < b1, a2 < b2, and b1 < a1, b2 < a2, we have
pure regular games.
We present two specific examples with finite sets of types
for the two players, one of which is actually the basis for the
round-robin tournament in the next section as well. Assume
T > R > M > P > M ′ = S and a1 < b1, a2 < b2
1) Example I: We choose the four discrete values, or types,
λ1 = 0, λ2 = a1, λ3 = b1, λ4 = 1
γ1 = 0, γ2 = a2, γ3 = b2, γ4 = 1
Note that λ2, γ2, λ3, γ3 give the values at the boundaries of
the three generic regions in the unit square with each other.
Table X gives the set of Nash equilibria for all possible pairs
(λm, γn).
From this table, we see that for pairs of types where there
is a choice of pure NE, we can choose a pure NE such that
we obtain TABLE XI
From the above, we see that the DG is completely pure
regular with (DDCC,DDCC) as a pure Bayesian NE.
a2
0
b2
1
0 a1 b1 1
(D,C)
(D,D)
(D,D)
(C,C)
(C,C),(D,D)
(D,D)
(C,C)
(C,C)
(C,D)
Fig. 4: The set of equilibria for each of the 9 generic regions
(b1 < a1, b2 < a2)
a2 < γ ≤ 1 (D,C) (D,C) (C,C) (C,C) (C,C)
γ = a2 (D,C) (D,C),(D,D),(C,C) (D,D),(C,C) (D,D),(C,C) (C,C)
b2 < γ < a2 (D,D) (D,D),(C,C) (D,D),(C,C) (D,D),(C,C) (C,C)
γ = b2 (D,D) (D,D),(C,C) (D,D),(C,C) (C,D),(D,D),(C,C) (C,D)
0 ≤ γ < b2 (D,D) (D,D) (D,D) (C,D) (C,D)
0 ≤ λ < b1 λ = b1 b1 < λ < a1 λ = a1 a1 < λ ≤ 1
TABLE IX: The equilibria for different social coefficients for
b1 < a1 and b2 < a2
2) Example II: We take 5 discrete values, or types for each
player as follows,
λ1 = 0, λ2 = a1, λ3 =
a1 + b1
2
, λ4 = b1, λ5 = 1
γ1 = 0, γ2 = a2, γ3 =
a2 + b2
2
, γ4 = b2, γ5 = 1
Table XII gives the set of Nash equilibria for all possible
pairs (λi, γi).
From this table, we can see that the DG is not completely
pure regular. We will use this DG in the next section for the
repeated PD game.
IV. ROUND ROBIN TOURNAMENT ANALYSIS
A computer tournament of the DG has been implemented to
operate as a framework, where we could test the validity of the
theoretical results, by comparing the performance of various
competing strategies. The structure of the tournament is round-
robin, and, thus, all the strategies compete in the iterated
double game against all the other strategies and themselves
once. Each game between any two strategies consists of 200
rounds and the total score of a strategy in a game is the
sum of the payoffs acquired from all the rounds. The average
score of a strategy accounts for its robustness and stability,
since the amount of strategies ensures the existence of a rather
competitive environment. The numerical values we use for the
γ4 (D,C) (D,C) (C,C),(D,C) (C,C)
γ3 (D,C) (C,D),(D,C) (C,D),(D,C),(C,C) (C,C),(C,D)
γ2 (D,D),(D,C) (D,D),(D,C),(C,D) (C,D),(D,C) (C,D)
γ1 (D,D) (D,D),(C,D) (C,D) (C,D)
λ1 λ2 λ3 λ4
TABLE X: The equilibria for different social coefficients for
a1 < b1 and a2 < b2 with four types per player
γ4 (D,C) (D,C) (C,C) (C,C)
γ3 (D,C) (D,C) (C,C) (C,C)
γ2 (D,D) (D,D) (C,D) (C,D)
γ1 (D,D) (D,D) (C,D) (C,D)
λ1 λ2 λ3 λ4
TABLE XI: The equilibria chosen for different social coeffi-
cients from TABLE X
payoff values are the following:
T = 5, R = 3, M1 = M2 = 2.5, P = 1, M
′
1 = M
′
2 = S = 0
These values are chosen precisely to create an environment,
where a real dilemma is present. Given the aforementioned
values for the payoffs, a strategy can score between 0 and
1000 in a single game.
A score of 0 can be obtained by either a strategy that has
a social coefficient equal to 0 and cooperates throughout the
whole game, while the opponent only defects, or a strategy
that has a social coefficient equal to 1 and defects throughout
the whole game, irrespective of what its opponent does.
On the other hand, a score of 1000 can only be obtained
by a strategy that has a social coefficient equal to 0 and
defects throughout the whole game, while the opponent only
cooperates.
A score of 200 can be obtained by two strategies that have
social coefficients equal to 0 and mutually defect throughout
the whole game.
A score of 500 can be obtained by a strategy that has a
social coefficient equal to 1 and cooperates throughout the
whole game, irrespective of what the opponent does.
Finally, a score of 600 can be obtained by two strategies
that have social coefficients equal to 0 and mutually cooperate
throughout the whole game.
The scores for a single game described here give us an idea
of what to expect from the games, and, as we will see, the
winner of the tournament has an average score of higher than
600.
A significant aspect of the tournament is the selection of a
social coefficient by a strategy. As mentioned, we allow the
social coefficient to be part of the discrete set of five distinct
values, that we used in the theoretical analysis as in example
II,
0, a,
a+ b
2
, b, 1
γ5 (D,C) (D,C) (D,C) (C,C),(D,C) (C,C)
γ4 (D,C) (C,D),(D,C) (C,D),(D,C) (C,D),(D,C),(C,C) (C,C),(C,D)
γ3 (D,C) (C,D),(D,C) (C,D),(D,C) (C,D),(D,C) (C,D)
γ2 (D,D),(D,C) (D,D),(D,C),(C,D) (C,D),(D,C) (C,D),(D,C) (C,D)
γ1 (D,D) (D,D),(C,D) (C,D) (C,D) (C,D)
λ1 λ2 λ3 λ4 λ5
TABLE XII: The equilibria for different social coefficients
for a1 < b1, a2 < b2 with five types per player.
The strategies are allowed to change their social coefficients
within the game and adapt them to the environment they face.
This is done due to the fact that the repeated DG for the PD is
assumed to reflect a range of situations, spanned over a finite
interval of time, represented by the number of rounds of the
game. As a result, since human beings can change their social
values, according to the experiences that they acquire, it seems
realistic to have a varying social coefficient for the repeated
version of the DG for the PD.
However, since it is difficult to quantify exactly by how
much human beings change their social values, we only allow
the strategies to change their social coefficients stepwise, and,
as a result, they can either increase them or decrease them by
one value at any round. This is done to avoid having strategies
changing their social coefficients from a value of 0 to that of 1
in a single round, since, it is believed that, only under extreme
and unprecedented circumstances would such a sudden change
occur in one’s social values.
The strategies participating in the tournament vary in ways
such as their algorithmic complexity, the choice they make for
the first round of the game and their initial social coefficient.
Some of them take into account the decisions that their oppo-
nent has made up to the point of consideration in the game,
some use probabilistic estimations and even randomness in
making their decisions, some have already made up their mind
and follow rules that do not change according to the flow of the
game, some make use of Bayesian inference and others use the
(λ, γ) diagrams to make their decisions according to the Nash
equilibria indications. In essence, a strategy consists of an
algorithm and so it operates according to certain instructions,
changes the social coefficient and provides the decision of
whether to cooperate or defect.
The initial social coefficient of a strategy shows its inten-
tions, since a low social coefficient usually implies proneness
to defection, while a high social coefficient on the other
hand cooperation. Varying initial social coefficients across
tournaments mean changing initial conditions, and, as a result,
dynamic environments. Certain strategies have complex ways
for dealing with their opponents’ initial behaviour, and, so,
what they may infer from it, may, in some cases, pre-determine
the rest of the course of the game. In addition, most strategies
have algorithms that modify their social coefficient in almost
every round, thus, enabling them to achieve in the course of the
game their optimal social coefficient for a particular game and
adapt to the environment that has been developed from their
opponents’ actions. Then, they can respond effectively to both
cooperative and defective behaviours and not be restricted by
their choice of initial social coefficient.
As mentioned in the theoretical part of the analysis of the
DG, different kinds of behaviour are observed when λ and γ
change.
With 0 ≤ λ ≤ a and 0 ≤ γ ≤ a, the Nash equilibrium is
provided by (D, D), i.e. mutual defection. So, for such social
coefficients, we expect to see defective behaviours as strategies
try to recognise their opponents’ intentions and see whether
they can get away with defection, or they will face retaliatory
behaviour.
With a < λ < b and a < γ < b, the Nash equilibria are
provided by (C, D) and (D, C), i.e. a game of brinkmanship.
So, for such social coefficients, the player who defects first
has an advantage and dominates by gaining from an oppo-
nent’s cooperation. However, with the increase of the social
coefficient, cooperating can be beneficial, since a player can
gain the reward from the SG. In that way, a lot of strategies
change their behaviour at this stage and employ a cooperative
approach to the game.
With b ≤ λ ≤ 1 and b ≤ γ ≤ 1, the Nash equilibrium
is provided by (C, C), i.e. mutual cooperation. So, for such
social coefficients, strategies with cooperative behaviour can
gain the social rewards and not suffer the social punishments
from the SG. The various stages of the social coefficients’
changes that alter the form of the DG are summarised below.
• 0 ≤ λ ≤ a, 0 ≤ γ ≤ a:
Nash equilibria: (D, D)
PD
• a < λ < b, a < γ < b:
Nash equilibria: (C, D), (D, C)
Chicken Game / Game of Brinkmanship
• b ≤ λ ≤ 1, b ≤ γ ≤ 1:
Nash equilibria (C, C)
Cooperation Game
V. SEG
The results of the tournament showed a clear winning strategy,
whose average and cumulative scores were much higher than
those of any other participating strategy. Its algorithm is
a mixture of the results of the theoretical work and some
conditions on how to alter its social coefficient, so as to adapt
to the course of action of any game. This strategy was devised
to take the maximum benefits of a game, irrespective of the
nature of the opposing strategies.
We call it SEG and explain its functionality as follows. SEG
is based on two parts; deciding whether to cooperate or defect
and altering its social coefficient based on some pre-defined
conditions. For the former, it looks up the (λ, γ) diagram and
behaves as the Nash equilibria indicate, thus, its decision of
whether to cooperate or defect depends only on the theoretical
work and the results drawn from it. For the latter, it changes
its social coefficient according to the following conditions:
• If SEG chose C and its opponent chose C in the previous
round, it does not change its social coefficient.
• If SEG chose C and its opponent chose D in the previous
round, it increases its social coefficient.
• If SEG chose D and its opponent chose C in the previous
round, it decreases its social coefficient.
• If SEG chose D and its opponent chose D in the previous
round, it increases its social coefficient.
It should be also mentioned that its initial social coefficient
is 0, the result of which is that in the first round it defects,
since this is indicated by the Nash equilibria in the (λ, γ)
diagram.
Its success can be attributed to several reasons. It works
on the principle of adjusting its social coefficient based not
only on its opponent’s behaviour, but its own as well. If its
opponent defected and it either cooperated or defected in the
previous round, it increases its social coefficient to avoid the
disastrous cycles of mutual defection, that would be caused by
a low social coefficient, since that would be the indication from
the Nash equilibria in the (λ, γ) diagram. In that way, SEG,
instead of trying to alter its opponent’s behaviour by retaliating
to its defections, realises that it is better off by increasing its
social coefficient to get the social rewards from cooperation. If
its opponent cooperated and it defected in the previous round,
it decreases its social coefficient, as it sees that the opponent
does not retaliate to its defections, so it exploits the situation
and behaves as instructed from the Nash equilibria in the (λ, γ)
diagram, so as to get the temptation’s payoff to defect. In a
sense it exploits the opponent in that particular case, however,
it is the opponent who allows that behaviour by not retaliating.
In such cases, some strategies allow themselves to be taken
advantage of, because, if they have a high social coefficient,
they can get the social rewards from cooperation and not
concern themselves about their opponents’ actions. Finally, if
both its opponent and it cooperated in the previous round,
it keeps its social coefficient, so as to make this cooperation
stable and sustainable.
Although SEG seems a strategy that promotes defective
behaviour, that is not the case, as with all the strategies
that are cooperative and do not let themselves to be taken
advantage of, cooperation emerges quickly. Also, in its choice
of whether to cooperate or defect, it behaves as specified
by the Nash equilibria in the (λ, γ) diagram, so it does
not behave oddly and unrealistically, such as defecting with
a high social coefficient or cooperating with a low social
coefficient. It should be also noted that in the points, where
there exist multiple Nash equilibria, and there is a choice
between cooperating and defecting, we follow our theoretical
analysis and select defection, as this potentially maximises the
payoff, given the particular payoff values.
Another fact that shows the success of SEG is that we
conducted two separate tournaments, where we changed the
values of M, the social rewards payoff for cooperation, to 3
and 2, respectively, to see whether the value of 2.5, which was
our initial selection, biased the results. The result was that, in
both cases, SEG was the winning strategy of the tournament.
The rankings, the total scores of the 10 top-scoring strate-
gies, the initial social coefficients and their decisions of
whether to cooperate or to defect in the first round (when
the choice is specified by the Nash equilibria of the (λ, γ)
diagram, we write NE) are presented in TABLE XIII.1
Ranking Strategy Total Score Initial Social Coeff. Initial Choice
1 SEG 121536.49 0.00 NE
2 ANE 114694.48 0.00 NE
3 BNE 113751.58 0.00 NE
4 ADAPTIVE 112387.83 0.00 C/D
5 TQC 109570.71 0.29 D
6 MTFT 108649.00 0.00 D
7 MIXED 103372.31 1.00 C
8 SD 97643.53 0.44 C/D
9 DTFT 97330.00 0.00 C
10 TFT 96805.00 0.00 C
TABLE XIII: Top 10 Scoring Strategies, Total Scores, Initial
Social Coefficients and Initial Choices
The rankings and the average scores of the 10 top-scoring
strategies are presented in table XIV.2
Ranking Strategy Average Score
1 SEG 633.00
2 ANE 597.37
3 BNE 592.46
4 ADAPTIVE 585.35
5 TQC 570.68
6 MTFT 565.88
7 MIXED 538.40
8 SD 508.56
9 DTFT 506.93
10 TFT 504.19
TABLE XIV: Top 10 Scoring Strategies, Average Scores
Let us now isolate some of the games of SEG and examine
them, so that its strengths in getting the maximum from a
game, will become apparent.
• SEG vs. ALLD:
ALLD is a strategy that has an initial social coefficient
equal to 0, it constantly chooses D and never changes
its social coefficient.
The game decisions between the two are as follows:
SEG: D D D C D C C C C C . . . C . . . C
ALLD: D D D D D D D D D D . . . D . . . D
As we can see, since SEG initially has a social coefficient
equal to 0, it chooses what the Nash equilibria of the
1Please note that the algorithms of the strategies participating in the round-
robin tournament are not presented here due to space constraints.
2Same as 1.
(λ, γ) diagram indicate, which, for such a social
coefficient, is D. However, although other strategies
would keep choosing D against ALLD, and thus, get
hurt from mutual defection, the algorithm of SEG
makes it increase its social coefficient, and, from the
seventh round and onwards, it has a very high social
coefficient, and, thus, chooses C for the rest of the game.
It gets the maximum possible of points from a clearly
uncooperative strategy like ALLD.
• SEG vs. ALLC:
ALLC is a strategy that has an initial social coefficient
equal to 1, it constantly chooses C and never changes its
social coefficient.
The game decisions between the two are as follows:
SEG: D D D D D D D D D D . . . D . . . D
ALLC: C C C C C C C C C C . . . C . . . C
As we can see, since SEG initially has a social coefficient
equal to 0, it chooses what the Nash equilibria of the
(λ, γ) diagram indicate, which, for such a social
coefficient, is D. Then, it realizes that ALLC will not
retaliate to its defections and keeps choosing D, so
that it can constantly acquire the temptation to defect
payoff. In some sense, it exploits the unwillingness
of ALLC to retaliate, however, ALLC gets the social
reward for cooperation, so it is not entirely taken
advantage of, since a high social coefficient allows a
strategy to be indifferent towards the opponent’s actions.
Again, SEG gets the maximum possible of points from
a cooperative, that does not retaliate, strategy like ALLC.
• SEG vs. TFT:
TFT is a strategy that has an initial social coefficient
equal to 1, it initially chooses C, and for the rest of the
game chooses what its opponent chose in the last round.
It does not change its social coefficient.
The game decisions between the two are as follows:
SEG: D D D D C C C C C C . . . C . . . C
TFT: C D D D D C C C C C . . . C . . . C
As we can see, since SEG initially has a social coefficient
equal to 0, it chooses what the Nash equilibria of the
(λ, γ) diagram indicate, which, for such a social coeffi-
cient, is D. TFT initially chooses C, but then retaliates
to the defection of SEG and chooses D. Thus, although
after the first round, SEG decreased its social coefficient,
after the second round and the retaliatory behaviour of
TFT, it increases its social coefficient, so as to avoid
the destructive consequences of mutual defection. Then,
after the fifth round, it has increased its social coefficient
enough, so that the Nash equilibria indicate C as the
choice for the next round. TFT reciprocates both coop-
eration and defection, and, thus, chooses C in the next
round, as well. Therefore, for the remaining rounds, both
strategies choose C, and, cooperation based on reciprocity
has emerged. Again, SEG gets the maximum possible
points from an opponent that is cooperative, but protects
itself, and retaliates to defection, as well.
The conclusion to be drawn is that SEG seems to be a
strategy that performs well under numerous environments and
it shows signs of robustness and stability. It successfully puts
the theoretical results into practice, since it uses the Nash
equilibria, single or multiple, of the (λ, γ) diagrams to make its
decisions. It uses its social coefficient to promote cooperation
based on reciprocity, to protect itself from purely defective
strategies, and to exploit situations, where it realises that there
is no willingness for retaliation from the opponent. Finally,
although it starts by choosing D and by having a low initial
social coefficient, it can quickly change its behaviour, should
it see signs for cooperation based on reciprocity from the
opponent’s side.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have introduced Multi-Games (MG) which
can be used when a number of players need to divide up their
resources according to different weights to a given number of
games which are then played out simultaneously. For the case
of a two-player Double Game (DG) in which each player has
the same set of strategies for the two basic games, we have
shown that when the possible weights for each player belong
to a finite set of types, it is possible to decide in linear time if
there is a set of local pure NE for all pairs of types, for which
the strategy of each player only depends on its own type. In
such a case we immediately obtain a Bayesian pure NE for
the DG.
This result, in future work, will be extended to mixed NE
on the one hand and to any N-player MG on the other.
A challenging question is if we can reduce the complexity
of computing a Bayesian NE for a pure regular (but not
completely pure regular) MG.
We also extended the classical PD with a Social Game (SG)
to obtain a DG which can model the prosocial behaviour of
human agents. We showed that two types of DG are possible
with some reasonable assumptions about the SG. For one of
these two possibilities, we provided two examples for DG
with finite sets of types for the players, of which the first
was completely pure regular, with a pure Bayesian NE which
was directly determined, while the second was not.
Finally, we conducted a tournament consisting of various
strategies for the repeated DG of the second example above.
This provided a testing framework for our work, and we
devised a winning strategy. In this repeated version of the
DG for future work, we could keep, in each round of a game,
separate scores for the material and social components of each
strategy. Then at the end of the final game, we can take a
convex combination of the two total scores by applying a
global weight, which would be determined by society as a
whole. This we believe would add to the degree of realism
that the DG aims to achieve.
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